Computer Hacker Pirates 03
Continued from in Lprint # 4
False Swiatek showed up again in one of the next nights. He
penetration is no longer the phone line, like last time, and
through a special data network firm TimNet. This is more
perfect communication system in which the information is
compressed in the so- called packets and transmitted through a
cable with a high throughput ability. Such data processing not
only ensures places without interference, but also accelerates,
and hence reduces the cost of transmission for the user.
At this time, apparently, have been completed exploration, the
unknown acted boldly, though not for a second vigilant.
Constantly hedging, trying not to betray its presence, he
hosted in the network for three hours, showing outstanding
ability programmer, as well as excellent knowledge of the
operating system UNICS running into the computer LBL. Important
- he managed to cheat software package ATRUN - inspectors and
watchmen of computers, which every five minutes checking all of
the arrays of information and clears them of extraneous
elements, which has a full set electronic keys. This is the
holy of holies of the entire system, access to which have only
a few trusted employees. Pseudo-Swiatek has created this
"Trojan horse" - a program for all respects similar to ATRUN,
but work strictly in intervals between pyatimimnutnymi to
bypass software-patrols this ATRUNa. With the help of a pirate
calmly robbed kompyuyuter. And then ... Stoll did not believe
their equipment. The offender is so insolent that no
udovletvorivshis computer system LBL, immediately connected
through it to Military Mil-Net network in Nebraska and seems to
have carefully ransacked her TSEVM!
Case of 75 cents a smell of a major espionage. But alas, until
that unable to determine even the number of lines "TimNet" which
worked as a spy, not to mention the address of his terminal.
All the best mastering the craft of computer counterspy,
former astronomer made a small program to help
him from night duty. As soon as the False Swiatek was part of a
network LBL, all his actions were recorded automatically. K
Observations joined experts "TimNet". And finally tip
thread failed to grasp: the connection was going from Oakland /
4 km from the San Francisco / terminal telephone company Bell. A
there reported that the trail leads along the lines of
communication through the entire 5096 country in McLean,
Virginia. Again Atlantic Coast!
However, this is all that could help Stoll administration Bell
by U.S. law, information about telephone subscribers
Company has the right to give only the police. But
counterintelligence, came to war, nothing could stop. He
attentively listened to tape recordings of negotiations staff
lines, made during a joint hunt for Fake Swiatek and
caught the words: "Communication in Virginia by 422 ... or 448
...? and connection to 1060 ". Stay on the phone to dial the
code Virginia - 703, and then try the numbers 427-1060 and
448-1060. The second of them responded to the sound
characteristic computer modem. This room belonged to the firm
"Met" working at the Pentagon.
Do not say anything - a godsend for the spy ... Here, for the
deaf fence, armed patrols with dogs guarding top secret
production of military computers. Together with the
administration of the firm Stoll first of all checked - whether
the number "Met" is busy every time a pirate in a network LBL.
And although it quickly confirmed, the move beyond failed.
"Read address terminal is very difficult - explained specialists
information security. - In our network, computers soedeniny
one common cable. To determine the source of the call will
Manually decode the addresses of all without exception packets.
But Stoll was able to use the maximum amount of information to
facilitate problem. He drew attention to the huge delay in
response when sharing data - more than three seconds. This
meant that the pirate went to the terminal "Met" in line very
long. True, if you just multiply more than three seconds, the
rate of light and split into two, would be, that the spy sits
not only outside of America, but generally somewhere beyond the
orbit of the moon - on the distance of about half a million
kilometers. But the fact that long-distance transmission of
information related to the main delay treatment. Most of the
way messages travel in a batch form, and at each stage of
re-coded, and for this estesvenno takes time. Means that would
determine the true distance, it is necessary to know the total
time of packaging to the entire route, that is, the number of
suitable devices. Not too simple, but, even so is easier than
decoding a row all the addresses. It is clear that parallel to
this work, Stoll single day never forgotten monitor the
progress of "godson". But progress has been just brilliant
because the False Swiatek also worked tirelessly. A few weeks
later, he beat a path to objects such visits are would do
credit to the mothers of the spy: >> Military Base in
Alabama, where he received information about combat
readiness of the nuclear long-range missiles; >>
Ultra-secure military network research, where he entered
under the password "Cromwell" and code 1674 / year of the death
of his son / found in the file LBL-Net;
>> Information Center CIA, which searched the four
computer;
>> Laboratory of Artificial Intelligence, Massachusetts
th Institute of Technology;
>> Mil-Net network in Nebraska, where he stubbornly
crept
the secrets of the firm MIS - developer / what irony! /
protection of military communication lines;
>> Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, projecting the
classifying space shuttle ". Not only that: visiting the U.S.
Air Force bases in Germany, Okinawa and Hawaii, entering into
data banks Pentagon, the Navy arsenal, Centres development of
aircraft and missiles, as well as arms dealers hackers got a
tremendous amount of information about weapons, especially
nuclear ones. Between times he had visited and European Centre
for Nuclear Research in Geneva / CERN /, as well as some of the
largest firmproizvoditeley computer. At the same time entering
into the taste of the investigation and mustered unique
experience, counterintelligence decided to personally
experience the strength of protect sensitive information
networks. From his apartment, through the ordinary personal
computer, under the guise of code lab Berkeley, he almost got
into the labor TSEVM troubled firms "Met." Dismantled its
programs, Stoll knew that the spy left here the same "Trojan
horse" that in his native LBL, and then in half a year come out
to hunt for all United States, and the company also paid for
his "heavy" work wholesale and retail.
Prodlozhenie in the next issue
